This is an interesting look at who becomes part of a secret police. It's not true believers, but rather people who don't have career prospects in a legitimate military or police unit. They decide to join this alternative organization where the incentives are reversed: the worse they are at their old job, the more willing they are to do more of what their new job asks.

The Secret Police Playbook:

... the officers who joined Battalion 601 had, in the main, performed worse than their peers at the military academy. They had graduated toward the bottom of their cohorts. They had stalled in the lower and middle ranks. They were men whose regular career paths had quietly closed.

These were not the most extreme officers in Argentina’s army. They were the most stuck.

The worse an officer’s academic record, the more likely he was to join the secret police. Once inside, the worst performers were assigned to the most brutal departments, where the work was most repugnant and the career reward for doing it most valuable.The worse an officer’s academic record, the more likely he was to join the secret police. Once inside, the worst performers were assigned to the most brutal departments, where the work was most repugnant and the career reward for doing it most valuable.

This is what we call the detouring logic: career-pressured officers “detour” through repressive units not because they are fanatics, but because the detour is the only viable path upward.

An existing institution — in this case, federal law enforcement or the military — provides the talent pool. It already contains, by the logic of any competitive promotion system, a substantial number of career-pressured officials: people who have plateaued, who feel passed over, who sense their professional options narrowing.

The second pyramid is the new or repurposed unit — the one that will be staffed with willing enforcers. ICE has existed for more than two decades, but it is now being massively expanded. Its budget tripled under the “One Big Beautiful Bill,” to a level larger than all other federal law enforcement agencies combined. The agency is hiring over 10,000 new agents. It is, structurally, a rapidly growing second ladder — and it needs to be filled.

The second pyramid has to offer something the first cannot: advancement opportunities and the prospect of status gains for people whom the first pyramid has passed over. This means positions, bonuses, and a relaxed vetting process.

To enlarge the pool of career-pressured recruits available for the second, the authoritarian makes the professional environment in the first pyramid less secure and less attractive.To enlarge the pool of career-pressured recruits available for the second, the authoritarian makes the professional environment in the first pyramid less secure and less attractive.

Career-pressured officers are not making ideological commitments. They are making career bets. For the detour to be worth taking, they need to know they will be protected when they push legal and ethical limits. This signal must be credible, and it must be public — because it needs to be heard by everyone calculating whether the bet is worth making.Career-pressured officers are not making ideological commitments. They are making career bets. For the detour to be worth taking, they need to know they will be protected when they push legal and ethical limits. This signal must be credible, and it must be public — because it needs to be heard by everyone calculating whether the bet is worth making.

In our book, career pressure produces two rival solutions to the same career problem. One is the described detouring: officers demonstrate loyalty through repression because a coercive assignment offers the only ladder left. The other is forcing: when careers collapse and exits close, some officers decide the best way to salvage their future is to remove the leadership that made them expendable—by conspiring against the regime rather than serving it.

That is why Trump is playing with fire when he weaponizes career pressure. The same pressure that can fill a growing coercive apparatus with willing enforcers can also manufacture a coup risk. And if the regime fast-tracks yesterday’s losers, it also threatens yesterday’s winners. When promotion and prestige are suddenly rerouted, even high performers can become angry stakeholders—raising incentives for moves that destabilize the leadership that rewrote the ladder.